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Abstract
According to the life-cycle theory of consumption and saving, foreseeable
retirement events should not reduce consumption. Whereas some consump-
tion expenditures may fall when they are self-produced (given higher leisure
after retirement), this argument applies especially to housing consumption
which can hardly be substituted by home production. We test this hypothesis
using micro data for Germany (GSOEP) and ﬁnd that income reductions when
entering retirement have a negative effect on housing expenditures for tenants.
For some econometric speciﬁcations, this effect is signiﬁcantly stronger than
the one of income changes at other times. While this result suggests that the
strict consumption-smoothing hypothesis is violated for the subgroup of non-
home owners, the effect is quantitatively small, which explains the ambiguity
of previous ﬁndings.
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11 Introduction
Do people save too little? Put differently, do they under-save compared to the
benchmark prediction of the standard life-cycle model? (Modigliani and Brum-
berg, 1954; Friedman, 1957) Undersaving would mean that people are unable to
smooth their consumption paths according to the permanent-income hypothesis of
consumption and saving,1 and “the best evidence of undersaving is probably the
observation that, upon retirement, individuals, on average, reduce consumption
substantially.” (Akerlof, 2002, p. 424) That is the so-called retirement-consumption
puzzle. Since the consumption function is a central building block of most (macro-)
economic models, it is a fundamentally important issue whether the standard life-
cycle model provides a good approximation to reality or not. By conducting a new
test of the consumption-smoothing hypothesis we contribute to the literature on
whether people save enough for retirement, and therefore whether the life-cycle
theory of consumption is valid in general. The novelty of our approach revolves
around our focus on housing consumption. First, these expenditures cannot be
substituted by the increased leisure after retirement (see below). Second, we ex-
ploit the fact that a large part of the German population do not own their homes,
which means (a) that their housing expenditures are directly observable as rents
paid, and (b) that they are potentially more prone to the undersaving problem due
to the absence of housing wealth.
Thereisnoconsensusintheeconomicliteratureontheexistenceofaretirement-
consumption puzzle, and the debate is still ongoing. On the one hand, there is the
position that “retired people are commonly believed to tailor their consumption
to a concept of income rather than to the value of their assets.” (Akerlof, 2007,
p. 18) Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) conclude: “We argue that the only way
to reconcile fully the fall in consumption with the life-cycle hypothesis is with the
systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information.” This ﬁnding would at least
reject the life-cycle-cum-rational-expectations strong form of the model, since “sys-
1Of course consumption smoothing may still imply rising or falling consumption paths given
differentials between personal time discount rates and net (after-tax) interest rates, but discrete and
sudden jumps are ruled out.
2tematic” and “unexpected” together are incompatible with rational expectations.
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) also reject life-cycle models in favor of
rule-of-thumb or mental-accounting savings behavior. Benartzi and Thaler (2007)
cite broad evidence that the standard model fails.2
On the other hand there is an important opposing strand of the literature which
argues that extended models of optimizing and forward-looking behavior are com-
patible with the empirical observations.
First, although they do not directly analyze consumption after retirement, re-
cently some researchers have addressed the undersaving issue by putting partic-
ular emphasis on the complex institutional environment facing the agents. Gour-
inchas and Parker (2002) are able to ﬁt a model of optimal life-cycle consumption
expenditures to the US data “quite well” taking into account realistic labor market
features. Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) also claim that the household-
speciﬁc predictions from an optimizing model with a realistic account of the en-
vironment are close to observed wealth values; however, still 20% of households
hold less wealth than would be prescribed by the optimal decision model.
Second, the following important objections to the validity of the retirement-
consumption puzzle have been put forward in the literature, see also Hurst (2008)
for a survey, and Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) for associating changes in consump-
tion with these arguments:
 Measured consumption expenditure of many goods may decrease at retire-
ment because of increased home and self-production, and also because work-
related expenses become unnecessary. Baxter and Jermann (1999) in general
ﬁnd that allowing for home production explains the apparent excess sensitiv-
ityofconsumptiontoincomethatwouldotherwiseinvalidatethepermanent-
income hypothesis. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) ﬁnd “dramatically” rising time
use on home production which substitutes for example the drop in expendi-
tures on food, such that food consumption stays roughly unchanged for re-
tirees. With German SOEP panel data Schwerdt (2005) ﬁnds a positive corre-
2Theretirement-consumptionpuzzleisjustonemanifestationofthegeneral(alleged)excesssensi-
tivityofconsumptiontocurrentincome. ForevidenceonthisphenomenonseeforexampleCampbell
and Mankiw (1990); Attanasio and Browning (1995); Reis (2006).
3lation between consumption reductions at retirement and (proxies for) home
production, but he argues that not all of the fall of consumption can be at-
tributed to that effect, because there is a general rise in home production.
Recently Lührmann (2010) reﬁned those ﬁndings for Germany by combining
both consumer expenditures and time use data pre and post-retirement. She
reveals a signiﬁcant drop in expenses at retirement which coincides with an
increase in time spent on home production.
 The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated changes is important.
Blau (2008) ﬁnds that with anticipated retirement there is no consumption
drop in data from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS),3 although
the consumption drop is too large for the unanticipated retirees. Haider and
Stephens (2007) show that a portion (but less than half) of the observed drop
of consumption at retirement can be attributed to retirement happening un-
expected. Smith (2006) has a similar result showing that food spending only
decreases if (early) retirement happens involuntarily.
Our approach of testing the life-cycle model of consumption addresses these issues
in the following ways.
First, inordertocircumventtheproblemofmeasuringhomeproduction(whether
it rises and if so, by enough to substitute the consumption drop), we focus on a
speciﬁc aspect of consumption, namely that of housing. Housing cannot be substi-
tuted by home production, indeed it will usually be a complement to the increased
leisure time budget in the utility functions of individuals. Therefore according to
the neoclassical model, demand (and thus expenditures) for housing could actually
increase slightly after retirement (of course holding other things such as household
size equal). In contrast, a drop in housing consumption would be inconsistent with
the life-cycle model.
An empirical problem related to the measurement of housing consumption oc-
curs if people own their dwellings and therefore no payments can be observed.4
3Interestingly, this would mean that no (net) expenditures are substituted by home production, in
contrast to the previously described explanation of the same retirement-consumption puzzle.
4Also, high transaction costs of selling one’s house or apartment will induce home owners to
4In this regard the German institutional (and possibly cultural) environment is well
suited for our analysis because Germany is a country of relatively few home own-
ers.5 This has the advantage that housing expenditures are directly observable for
many households as rents paid. For these reason we analyze only non-home own-
ers. Obviously this implies that our results will not be (necessarily) representa-
tive for all individuals. Indeed, it is plausible that home owners suffer much less
from the under-saving problem precisely because of their owned house or apart-
ment, which represents cumulated savings (e.g. see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007).
However, since the life-cycle model is a hypothesis relating to all economic agents,
focusing on a suitable sub-group is still an informative approach.
Secondly, with respect to the issue of expected vs. unexpected retirement, in our
empirical analysis we control for early retirement events (which were partly used
as labor-market policy measures in the 1990s in Germany). We also account for
disability that may induce premature retirement. The remaining retirement events
should typically be well predictable for the individuals.6
The general idea of the test is to specify a panel-econometric model to explain
the reduction of housing expenditures. We use several different dependent vari-
ables and thus different model variants to operationalize the concept of housing
consumption reductions (some of which are binary, and one is continuous). Apart
from other control variables which will be explained in detail below, the mod-
els include two income growth variables, one for those observations when people
have just entered retirement, and another income growth variable for the remain-
ing observations. Under the life-cycle hypothesis we expect the latter variable to
simply stay in their old home and not adjust housing expenditures even if they actually desired to
do so. But note that in Germany another version of this argument also applies to tenants, because
the rent contracts of tenured occupants are protected against quick rises of rent payments. As a
consequence, giving up a long-inhabited apartment in Germany could imply a substantial rise of
rent payment obligations for the new apartment (holding other apartments characteristics ﬁxed). We
account for this institutional fact in the econometric models by including the cumulated tenure in the
old apartment as a control variable.
5Approximately half of all households (Tatsiramos, 2006).
6It may be argued that while the timing of retirement may be anticipated, the amount of the
income drop (i.e. the effective replacement rate) would at least be partly unexpected by the indi-
viduals. However, in the German deﬁned-beneﬁt public pension system the replacement rate is rel-
atively transparent. Also, while the amount of the drop may still be unexpected, it would not be
consistent with the life-cycle model to posit that rational individuals systematically overestimate their
post-retirement income levels.
5contribute to explaining (and be positively correlated with) housing consumption
changes, because a certain fraction of general income changes will come through
unexpected and permanent shocks which would shift permanent income.
However, income growth of people entering retirement should not signiﬁcantly
contribute to the explanation of a reduction of housing expenditures in the panel
sample. Otherwise, we would tend to think that the retirement-consumption puz-
zle is in principle relevant and that the life-cycle model does not hold in general. Of
course, there may also be unforeseeable permanent shocks at retirement, most no-
tably unexpected revaluations of an individual’s capital asset portfolio. However,
the vast majority of Germans have held assets with deterministic payoffs instead of
risky stock portfolios, apart from their implicit entitlements in the pay-as-you-go
pension system. Therefore these shocks (which are not observable in our dataset)
should be negligible.
Our main result is that we indeed ﬁnd that (negative) income growth at (fore-
seeable) retirement helps to explain a reduction of housing consumption. The point
estimates of that effect even turn out to be larger (in absolute value) than the coef-
ﬁcients for income growth of non-retirers. Therefore our test rejects the life-cycle
model of consumption as a generally valid theory of economic behavior. How-
ever, the effect is not large even for our subgroup of non-homeowners which may
explain the ambiguous conclusions in the existing literature
This paper is structured as follows: In the next section we review the theoretical
background for consumption (particularly housing consumption) behavior by dis-
tinguishing effects within neoclassical versus behavioral economics models. Our
empirical approach of testing the consumption-smoothing hypothesis is outlined
in section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Theory
There are a number of relevant theories for the question of how current consump-
tion is determined, and to what extent it depends on wealth or current income.
62.1 Neoclassical effects
Before discussing explanations and hypotheses based on behavioral economics, let
us ﬁrst revisit neoclassical models and how they could be compatible with cer-
tain observed patterns of consumption, especially housing consumption around
the time of retirement. By “neoclassical” we basically mean models with agents
whoareoptimizersconstrainedbytheirenvironment(includingtheirbudget), who
have time-consistent preferences, and whose expectations are not systematically
biased. Even under these assumptions it could be the endogenously predicted be-
havior to move to a cheaper home right after retirement and not before, for the
following reasons:
1. The search for a new home could be so costly in terms of forgone leisure that
it is optimal to postpone it until after retirement, when leisure is not scarce
anymore.
2. Workers are geographically bound to some extent by the location of their
workplace. They are only free to move away when they retire. Transaction
costsofmovingmaymakeitoptimaltocombinethislocationalmovewiththe
move to a cheaper home and not move twice. In this case the observed move
should then indeed lead to a sufﬁciently different geographical location.
3. In the same vein, retirees are free to move to places relatively far from eco-
nomic centers (cities, plants, ofﬁces, etc.), where housing may in general be
cheaper. Thus a move right after retirement to a cheaper home would not
prove by itself that the reason was the reduced current income. As with the
previous reason this effect could only apply to retirees who move relatively
far away from their old homes.
With respect to the costs-of-search explanation number 1 it should be borne in mind
that our sample is deliberately restricted to men beyond the age of 55 whose chil-
dren are typically not very time-demanding of their parents anymore. Note also
that the typical amount of hours worked per year is quite a bit lower in Germany
than for example in the US. Therefore it seems somewhat implausible that forgone
7leisure should inhibit people from searching for a cheaper home. Finally, people
may hire agents; in Germany those are usually only paid in case of a successful
match.
Addressing explanation number 2 we note the fact that only home tenants (as
opposed to home owners) are included in the sample, see below. But for home ten-
ants moving does not imply selling an illiquid asset and investing a large amount
of funds in a new home. Thus the involved transaction costs of moving would
not seem to be prohibitive and could therefore not plausibly explain the deferral of
moving to a new home.7
Note that all of these effects relate to the retirement event as such, not to an
associated income change. Therefore we will include those events in our empirical
modelasa(binary)controlvariabletocapturethoseeffects. Inordertogetageneral
picture about the reasons for moving we also specify a model to explain the move
to a new home as such, without conditioning on reduced rent payments.
2.2 Behavioral economic hypotheses
1. Norms / mental accounts: according to this view, the current income (or a
certain portion of it) of an agent is an entitlement to spend. Also, instead of
saving his income an agent spends a certain proportion of current income on
housing because that is customary and thus “norm”-al in the literal sense.8
Norms are hard to identify empirically; while the ratio of rent to current in-
come is observable and thus could give a hint of mental accounts playing a
part, a high rent-income ratio is of course also a “rational” reason to move.
2. Procrastination: it could also be the case that agents are perfectly aware that
they should rationally be moving to a cheaper home, but they suffer from
procrastination effects. (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) This explanation in
isolation would imply that agents used to have a good reason to live in their
expensive home. The most likely case is the space requirement of children.
7Apart from this theoretical argument a more pragmatic issue is that more detailed geographical
information in the GSOEP is subject to certain usage restrictions. Future research could possibly
incorporate such an analysis.
8See Shefrin and Thaler (1988) for a model with mental accounts.
8An observable and testable implication of this may be that people without
children or having separated or with other reasons to have lived in a spacious
home would not be affected so much by procrastination.
3. Finally, another simple explanation is myopia, i.e. the assumption that agents
simply do not consider their future needs. In its extreme form that would im-
ply that no income changes ever lead to an adjustment of current consump-
tion until wealth is depleted. In general, myopia of course induces undersav-
ing and tends to prevent wealth accumulation.
Note that the assumption of hyperbolic discounting (present bias) alone is not sufﬁ-
cient to generate an excess sensitivity of consumption to current income, as pointed
out for example in Akerlof (2007, fn 39) by invoking the analogy to Barro’s (1974)
well-known model with bequests: The future selves of an individual in a model
with hyperbolic discounting effectively take the role of the heirs in the dynastic
model. This insight changes a little in a “golden-eggs” model a la Laibson (1997),
where a rational agent with hyperbolic discounting preferences (and who knows
about his time inconsistent preferences) will invest in illiquid assets to avoid temp-
tation in the future. Effectively such an agent makes his future selves liquidity-
constrained. However, this implies an asymmetric sensitivity of consumption to
current income, even if the change of income is anticipated: If that income rises
a relatively large portion of it will be consumed, because the future income could
not be (easily) pre-committed. But if that income is expected to fall as in the case
of retirement, a rational agent with hyperbolic discounting would have invested in
assets with a corresponding duration (time to maturity).9 Thus he would be able to
smooth his cash ﬂow and hence his consumption expenditures.
3 Empirical approach
Our general approach to test the life-cycle hypothesis can be described as follows.
Our underlying assumption is that housing consumption and leisure are not sub-
9In developed countries such as Germany those types of assets clearly exist and are quite
widespread; for example so-called “capital life insurance” contracts which are essentially savings
plans that pay an annuity or a lump-sum payment after retirement.
9stitutes in the utility functions of agents (but might be complements). Hence, we
perform one-sided tests of the following hypotheses:
1. H0: no or positive effect of income changes at retirement on housing con-
sumption (compatible with the life-cycle hypothesis)
H1: negative effect
2. H0: weaker effect at retirement (compatible with the life-cycle hypothesis)
H1: stronger effect at retirement
The details of implementing these tests are described in this section.
3.1 GSOEP
To investigate the housing consumption behavior of people entering retirement we
draw on panel data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP
is a yearly micro-data panel which has been conducted in annual interviews of
individuals and households since 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 in East
Germany.10 It is well suited for our analysis as it contains detailed information on
both the retirement and the housing issues. From wave to wave respondents report
whether they have changed their employment status because of retirement and
whether they have moved to another apartment, including rental costs before and
after. Respondents also provide information about their household size, income
and other living circumstances. Moreover, this information is available over a long
period of time which enables us to gather a decent number of respondents who
actually enter retirement within the observation period.
Despite the many advantages of longitudinal data, panel attrition may be a par-
ticular problem when studying moving behaviour. According to the ofﬁcial doc-
umentation, panel attrition in the GSOEP, related to households that were lost af-
ter they moved to unknown new addresses, is roughly 0.5% on average each year
(Kroh, 2009). If it does have any effect on our results at all, this attrition is expected
to bias our ﬁndings in the direction of the life-cycle hypothesis.
10For a detailed description of the data set see SOEP Group (2001).
103.2 Sample selection
Due to some inconsistency in the wording of the SOEP questionnaires before 1993,
the retirement event cannot be deduced correctly, so we start with the panel wave
1994 (i.e. t-1 starts at 1993). The latest available wave at the time of writing is from
2008. Given a massive rent catch-up in East Germany from constrained levels in
the years after uniﬁcation, we leave out East German observations before 1997.
Self-employed workers and those with unemployment status in t and t-1 are also
excluded from the sample.
As we want to compare the housing behavior of recently retired workers with
other individuals (or households), we do not restrict the sample to those going into
retirement. Nevertheless, in order to obtain a relatively homogenous sample we
include men between the ages of 55 and 75, centered around the standard nominal
retirement age of 65.
An important feature of our analysis is that we focus on home tenants, thus ex-
cluding home owners. The main reason for this exclusion is that the current cost
of housing is unobservable for non-tenants. But it is clear that home owners tend
to stay in their apartments or houses after retirement. In general their behavior is
probably consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis to a larger extent than the behav-
ior of tenants, because the asset of a home itself constitutes a considerable savings
item for retirement. Therefore we acknowledge that in our setup we would ﬁnd
non-consumption-smoothing results more easily than in a representative sample of
the whole population. If we ﬁnd violations of the life-cycle hypothesis, this ﬁnding
would then not apply to the roughly 50% of the households in the GSOEP (in 2006)
who are home owners.
The number of observations along the time dimension is of course different for
each cross-sectional unit. Due to the fact that some variables are constructed as ﬁrst
timedifferencesorlagsweloseoneobservationinthetimedimensionforeachunit.
113.3 Important variables and estimation methods
We consider several variants of how to operationalize the reduction of housing
consumption expenditure. The dependent variable can be either of the following:
1. ym (“move”): For comparison purposes, we also analyze the move events in
our sample per se, i.e. irrespective of whether the new home is cheaper than
the old one or not. ym
it = 1 if individual i “did not live in the same home last
year”, ym
it = 0 otherwise. The mean of this variable in the sample (of course
with repeated observations per individual) is 5.1%.
2. ych (“move_cheaper”): Whether or not a move to a cheaper home took place.
This is constructed as ym
it 1(Drit < 0), where 1() is the indicator (Heaviside)
function and Drit is the growth rate (log-difference) between this year’s and
last year’s rent paid. This variable has a mean value of 1.9%.
3. yco (“move_cost”): Whether respondents answered “for cost reasons” as the
main reason for moving (yco
it = 1). However, this information is only availabe
in the SOEP from 1997 onwards. The mean of this variable is 1.0%.
4. Dr (“rentdiff”): Finally, as a continuous variable we also analyze the growth
rate of rent paid, as used before in the construction of ych. Note that this
concept does not presuppose a move to a new home, but might also capture
renegotiation of rents. The simple unconditional distribution of this variable
is displayed in ﬁgure 1.
In all cases the mainly interesting coefﬁcient(s) are those that refer to income
growth of retirers (people entering retirement). If the income drop at retirement
has a positive effect on moving to a cheaper home (or a negative effect on the cost
of the new home), we would interpret the evidence as being incompatible with the
life-cycle hypothesis, especially if the effect were stronger than that of the income
changes of non-retirers (since changes at retirement should be more foreseeable on
average).
The two income growth distributions are shown in ﬁgure 2. If we separate East
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Figure 1: Distribution of rent growth. (Measured as the time difference of the loga-
rithm, 0.1  10% growth, hence values below -1 are possible.)
in the East and -14.2% for West Germany. The main reason for the relatively low
income reduction in East Germany are the lower wages coupled with generous
pension entitlements that were granted after uniﬁcation.
Considering the income growth of retirers’ households it is also interesting that
a sizeable part of the observations displays rising income. As we consider house-
hold income, this increase may stem from life insurance contracts that become due
or a rising income of the spouse. Hence, it could be the case that there is a differ-
ent puzzle reﬂected in those observations, namely the possibility that many people
in Europe even save too much for old age, given the relatively high level of state-
provided old-age pensions and health care beneﬁts, compared to countries like the
US. However, that aspect is beyond the scope of this paper.
Thefractionofobservationswitharetirementeventis1.8%, wheretheconstruc-
tion of the retirement event dummy is actually not trivial: In the GSOEP question-
naire, respondents who have entered retirement recently (since last year’s survey)
can be identiﬁed with a combination of questions (i) on the termination of the last
job within the past or the current year and (ii) on the reason for leaving that job.
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Figure 2: Income growth of retirers (left) and the rest (right). (Measured as the time
difference of the logarithm, 0.1  10% growth, hence values below -1 are possible.)
survey year 1993. We deﬁne the variable "entering retirement" as taking the value 1
if the respondent reports the termination of his job since last year’s questionnnaire
and old-age pension or early retirement as the reason for this event. Entering an
early-retirement scheme is also considered in an additional variable "early retire-
ment" which, correspondingly, takes the value 1 if the respondent reports the ter-
mination of his job since last year’s questionnnaire and early retirement as the rea-
son for this event. We interpret "early retirement" as an interaction variable which
covers the additional effect of entering retirement rather unforeseeably and there-
fore unanticipatedly. In the GSOEP questionnaire, the early retirement information
is available until the year 1998 only. Hence the variable is always zero afterwards.
However, if a respondent reports a (regular) retirement event in two subsequent
years, we interpret the ﬁrst event as an early retirement and set the respective vari-
able to 1.
3.4 Model speciﬁcation
For the binary dependent variables as deﬁned before we use the following proba-
bility model in our panel context:
Pr(ys
it = 1jx) = L(as
i + x0
itbs), i = 1...N, t = 1...Ti, (1)
where s 2 fm,ch,cog indexes the different dependent variables and a are the un-
observed individual-speciﬁc effects. Note that x contains some time-invariant vari-
14ables as well as time dummies. The time dimension for this unbalanced panel
varies between all theoretically possible values (one to fourteen).
As L() is the logistic cdf, we choose a (panel) logit model instead of a probit
model. For the probit class, a ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation that does not suffer from
the incidental parameters problem is not available. In contrast, for the panel logit
model it is possible to use a conditional likelihood which does not depend anymore
ontheuniteffectsandwhichcanbeusedtoestimatetheremainingparameterscon-
sistently. A corresponding Hausman test variant can be used to assess whether the
speciﬁcation with uncorrelated (random) effects also yields consistent estimates.
As in the standard linear panel model, the random effects speciﬁcation is more ef-
ﬁcient if its assumptions are met. But indeed it turns out that the Hausman test
rejects some of the speciﬁcations with random effects in favor of (conditional) ﬁxed
effects.
Notethatunitswherealloutcomesarethesame(allzerooralloneovertime)do
not contribute information to the conditional likelihood for the ﬁxed-effects logit.
Hence below we report sample sizes without those units for the ﬁxed-effects spec-
iﬁcations; this is a feature of the conditional ﬁxed-effects model and should not be
mistaken for an arbitrary sample selection.
For the continuous variable Dr it turned out that a dynamic panel speciﬁcation
is appropriate:
Drit = aAB
i + r1Dri,t 1 + r2Dri,t 2 + x0
itbAB + eAB
it (2)
To estimate this model we use the well-known Arellano-Bond GMM estimator
which wipes out the individual-speciﬁc effects by ﬁrst differencing.





Whether a speciﬁcation with random or ﬁxed effects is more appropriate here
can be determined again by the standard Hausman tests.
15In all model variants our choice of control variables to account for the back-
ground noise of residential mobility is based on and extends the estimation re-
sults of Tatsiramos (2006). Tatsiramos (2006) studied residential mobility of people
over 50 in several European countries using the ECHP. As the German contribu-
tion to the ECHP data set is an adjusted sample of the GSOEP, we draw on those
variables that proved statistically signiﬁcant in explaining moves in Germany in
the speciﬁcation by Tatsiramos (2006). These include whether the respondent lost
his/her spouse, experienced a health shock (disability, not the continuing status,
3.5%), lives in a couple (77%) and with children (4.3%). In our speciﬁcation we
did not include living in an appartment and whether housing costs are a burden
nor household wealth because we did not ﬁnd appropriate panel information in
the GSOEP. In the estimation by Tatsiramos (2006), entering retirement proved an
additional important determinant of moving behavior; as discussed in section 2.1
we also include such a dummy –called “retiring”– in our models to capture effects
that would be compatible with the life-cycle model, and to make sure they are not
erroneously attributed to the income changes at retirement.
Of course we also include other control variables in our models: Binary vari-
ables are time dummies (ﬁxed effects along the time dimension), indicators for
East (mean of 30%) and North West Germany (referring to the states of Sleswick-
Holsatia, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia; mean
38%), loss of spouse (0.53%), job loss (0.67%), new job (1.4%), regular employment
status of spouse (9.5%), German nationality. Note that some of the variables are not
time-varying and therefore do not appear in ﬁxed-effect speciﬁcations below.
Other variables are: the income growth at entering early retirement to account
for unexpected retirement events. In contrast to regular old-age retirement, in
many cases early retirement –which in Germany had been used also as a type of
labor market policy and thus could happen to older workers who were laid off–
can be considered as unanticipated. Since early retirement events are a subset of
all retirement events, controlling for early retirement is thus desirable to focus on
anticipated old-age retirement.11 See also Blau (2008) for the importance of this dis-
11The information about early retirement is only available in the SOEP up to 1998. However, the
16tinction. Furthermore, log rent per square meter, the rent-income ratio, (log) house-
hold income, the change of household size as an integer-valued variable, age, and
thetenureinthecurrenthome(dividedby10asascalingdevice)arealsocontrolled
for.
We always allow a “realization” lag between the income drop and the potential
effect on housing consumption. That is, the income growth variables for retirers
and for the rest are always included contemporaneously and with a lag (of one
year).
To gain estimation efﬁciency we remove insigniﬁcant terms in a general-to-
speciﬁc fashion, based on a cutoff signiﬁcance level of 30%. However, at least one
of the income growth terms is always retained given that that estimate is the central
issue of this paper.
4 Estimation results
In table 1 the results of our panel logit estimations with respect to the binary de-
pendent variables of moving to a cheaper home or due to cost reasons are reported.
For the ﬁrst variant, with move_cheaper as the dependent variable, we use the
ﬁxed-effect speciﬁcation because the Hausman test rejects the random effects as-
sumption, whereas for the second variant, with move_cost, the assumption is not
rejected. Both variants include time dummies which are however not reported in
the table. The income growth variables are only relevant when they are lagged, the
contemporanous terms were insigniﬁcant and were thus removed. Note that the
initially included variables for early retirement also turned out to be insigniﬁcant.
For both dependent variables, income growth always lowers the probability of
reducing housing consumption by moving (so an income drop raises that proba-
bility). The point estimate of that effect is between 50 percent (variant 1) and more
than 300 percent (variant 2) higher for retirers, contrary to what the life-cycle hy-
pothesis would suggest. That is, in our sample people on average do adjust their
incidence of early retirement had been steadily decreasing in the 1990s, as it was recognized that (mis-
) using it for labor market policy purposes implied a heavy burden on the pension system. Therefore
the effects of having to ignore it (setting it to zero) after 1998 should be small.
17Table 1: Estimation results for reducing housing consumption by moving
move_cheaper (FE) move_cost (RE)
household inc. growth at
retirement
– –




household inc. gr. of
non-retirers
– –














change of household size  0.92
0.27
–














log rent per square meter
t-1
– –
N, å Ti 119, 863 1520, 7104
log likelihood -150.93 -269.64
equality test (income gr.) 0.16, p=0.69 2.16, p=0.1063
Hausman test random
effects
68.33, p=0.00 22.81, p=0.1190
Notes: Panel logit estimates, RE – random effects, FE – (conditional) ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors below estimates, two-sided signiﬁcance levels denoted by
*** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). Deﬁnitions of variables (see also subsection 3.3):
“move_cheaper” – moved into cheaper home, “move_cost” – moved because
of (self-proclaimed) cost reasons. Time dummies also included.
18housing expenses downward once they retire (instead of showing anticipative be-
haviour). However, the signiﬁcance of that result is ambiguous; in the case of mov-
ing to a cheaper home, the coefﬁcient for retirers is not signiﬁcant, while in the case
of moving due to cost reasons, the signiﬁcance level is even 1%. It is thus not sur-
prising that the effect for retirers is only close to being signiﬁcantly different from
the one for the rest of the observations in the latter variant.12
The results for the dependent variable “move” capturing any move are shown
in table 2. But even though the point estimate of the income growth effect of re-
tirers is almost twice as large as for non-retirers, a formal test is again unable to
reject the equal magnitude of the effects. It is interesting that even here the retire-
ment dummy does not signiﬁcantly explain the moves. Therefore it appears that
there is no general tendency for German tenants to relocate when the household
head retires. We only observe a signiﬁcant inﬂuence when the retirement event is
combined with information on the income growth.
With respect to the overall background factors explaining the general residen-
tial mobility in the sample, our estimates only partly concur with the ﬁndings of
Tatsiramos (2006). Our ﬁndings do not conﬁrm being disabled or living with chil-
dren as being statistically signiﬁcantly related to moving. Concerning the variables
log household income, rent-income ratio, and log rent per square meter, note that
they must be interpreted together. In isolation the positive coefﬁcient of income
levels may seem implausible, but it must be seen in conjunction with the coefﬁcient
of the rent-income ratio where income appears in the denominator; similarly with
the rent related variables.
Let us now turn to the analysis of actual rent paid as a cardinal measure of
housing consumption expenditures. Our main goal here is to estimate the effect
of income growth on rent growth, again separated between income growth of re-
tirers and non-retirers. Since rent growth is likely to be correlated over time, we
prefer a dynamic speciﬁcation. In the left column of table 3 we therefore employ
the Arellano-Bond GMM method where we allow for two lags of the endogenous
12Note that this Wald-type test is inherently two-sided, whereas our underlying hypothesis pair
was one-sided; thus the p-value may be overstated. For the other results it did not matter whether
we considered one-sided tests or simply the standard two-sided tests.
19Table 2: Estimation results for any move (cross-check)
move (FE)


















living in couple t-1  0.70
0.41
change of household size  0.27
0.16
rent-income ratio t-1 2.14
1.42
log household income t-1 1.07
0.48
tenure in home (years/10) 2.66
0.27
N, å Ti 269, 1840
equality test (income gr.) 0.84, p=0.36
Hausman test random effects 138.48, p=0.00
Notes: Panel logit estimates, RE – random effects, FE – (conditional) ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors below estimates, two-sided signiﬁcance levels denoted by ***
(1%), ** (5%), * (10%). Variable deﬁnition (see also subsection 3.3): “move” –
moved into new home. Time dummies also included.
20variable. The diagnostic tests conﬁrm the validity of the model’s assumptions;
the residual second-order correlation is not signiﬁcant and the instruments appear
valid (Sargan test).
Again, the income growth variable for retirers appears highly signiﬁcant, with
a positive sign which means that income drops reduce rents paid. Furthermore,
the corresponding income growth coefﬁcient for non-retirers is close to zero, and
here the equality of the two coefﬁcients is even rejected at the (two-sided) 5% level.
We obtain a broadly similar picture as with the logit speciﬁcations before: Income
growth signiﬁcantly affects housing consumption, and the effect is larger for retir-
ers than for non-retirers. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effects is small; this
dynamic model reveals a long-run elasticity of 0.12 from income to rent for retirers,
compared to an elasticity of 0.024 for non-retirers.
As a sensitivity analysis we also present a static model with robust standard er-
rors, in the right-hand column of table 3. The coefﬁcients also have plausible signs.
Income changes affect rent changes positively, whereas relatively high rent levels
as measured by a high rent-income ratio and a high rent per square meter lead to
slower rent growth. And the longer the household has inhabited its dwelling the
lower is the rent change.
In general, remember that the estimates only refer to non-home owners and as
far as they contradict the life-cycle model they are likely to be larger than for home
owners.
5 Conclusions
Based on the behavior of 55 to 75-year olds in the German SOEP we found that
(foreseeable) retirement events have a partly signiﬁcant negative effect on moving
to cheaper homes, and thus on housing expenditures. Our point estimates of the in-
come growth effects on moving (to cheaper homes or for cost reasons) and on rent
growth proved always higher for retirers. According to the life-cycle model we
would have expected the effects of foreseeable income changes at retirement to be
zero or at least smaller than the impact of other income changes. This suggests that
21Table 3: Estimation results for rent growth




1st lag rent growth  0.28
0.059
n.a.
2nd lag rent growth  0.11
0.032
n.a.



















log household income t-1 –  0.252
0.0382
rent-income ratio t-1 –  1.42
0.187




tenure in home (years/10) –  0.046
0.0097
N, å Ti 1095, 4670 1838, 9601
log likelihood, pseudo R2 n.a. 1183.889, 0.444
(adjusted: 0.311)
F-test unit effects n.a. P(F(1837, 7739) >
2.11931) =
2.16286e-107
no residual AR AR(2): p=0.847 AR(1): DW=1.93
Sargan over-id c2(41) = 45.25,
p=0.299
n.a.
equality test 4.03, p=0.045 0.94, p=0.33
Hausman test vs. random
effects
n.a. 3260, p=0
Notes: Linear panel estimates. Left column: Two-step Arellano-Bond GMM esti-
mator with lagged endogenous variables. Right column: Static ﬁxed-effects
model with autocorrelation-robust variance estimator. Standard errors below
estimates, two-sided signiﬁcance levels denoted by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%).
22the consumption-smoothing hypothesis of the life-cycle model of consumption and
saving may be violated for the subgroup of non-home owners. In principle this ev-
idence conﬁrms the existence of a retirement-consumption puzzle. As the leading
explanations of this puzzle are given by behavioral economic theories, aggregate
models would have to allow for heterogeneous agents not only in the sense of dif-
ferent endowments and shocks, but also in the sense of different behavioral rules
in order to capture these aspects of reality.
However, our results do not constitute strong evidence against the life-cycle
model in quantitative terms. First, our sample was deliberately restricted to non-
homeowners, and we expect the life-cycle model to be more accurate for home
owners due to their systematically higher cumulated savings that ﬁnanced their
home in the ﬁrst place. Secondly, the estimated effects for income drops at re-
tirement were sometimes only weakly signiﬁcant. And ﬁnally, the elasticity with
respect to housing expenditure growth appears to be quite small. To summarize,
our paper may explain why previous empirical results have been rather ambigu-
ous regarding a rejection of the life cycle hypothesis: the relatively small effect may
often be hidden by the noise in the data.
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A Institutional information Germany
It may be useful to summarize some characteristics related to the German housing
market.
There is a means-tested subsidy called “housing money”: Wohngeld. For reg-
istered unemployed it was subsumed under general unemployment beneﬁts and
social assistance (ALG II) starting in 2005 with the Hartz reform. Those who receive
Wohngeld are already in an “appropriate” apartment, so they should not have any
reason to move to a cheaper home. Unemployed people are not part of our sample.
The time that must elapse after the tenant announces his desire to end a rent
contract until the contract legally ends had been subject to another reform: since
June 2005 it is generally only 3 months for tenants, whereas until August 2001 it
was up to 12 months dependent on the past contract duration. Between September
2001 and May 2005 it depended on whether it was an old contract (old rules) or
new contract (new rules). In contrast, for landlords it has always depended on the
contract duration and mirrors the old rules for tenants (up to 12 months).
25Regulation of rent increases applying to apartments which are not “price con-
strained”(withoutMietpreisbindung–notethattherearealsoapartmentswherecon-
struction was state-subsidized and rents are therefore price constrained):
 Within 3 years the rent in an existing contract can only grow by 20% (not
counting recurrent costs like staircase cleaning or elevator maintenance etc.
(Betriebskosten), or modernization expenses.
 Theincreasedrentmaynotexceedthe“localstandardcomparisonrent”(LSCR,
ortsübliche Vergleichsmiete) which is determined based on ofﬁcial surveys.
 Raising the rent requires mandated approval by the tenant; if the tenant does
not grant this, the landlord must sue the tenant to legally get the mandated
approval, and prove in court that the rent increase meets legal requirements
(e.g. conforms to LSCR).
 A contract with a new tenant may not specify a rent exceeding the LSCR by
50%, but within this limit the landlady is in principle free to choose which
amount she demands.
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